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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900156-CA
Priority No. 2

CHARLES R. MARTINEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended), whereby a defendant in
a district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final order following conviction for any crime other
than a first degree or capital felony.

In this case, final judgment

and commitment was rendered by the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge,
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of relevant statutes and constitutinal provisions
is set forth in Addendum C.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in revoking
Mr. Martinez' probation based on allegations 3 and 4 in the Affidavit
in Support of Order to Show Cause?

The appropriate standard of review is whether
the trial judge abused his discretion; however,
Appellant argues that for a trial judge to properly
exercise his or her discretion in revoking
probation, there must be at least a preponderance of
the evidence.
Did the officers illegally search and seize the evidence
from the apartment?
This is a question of law.
Were Mr. Martinez' federal due process rights violated when
the trial judge relied on conditions not set forth in the Affidavit
in violating Mr. Martinez' probation?
This is a question of law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant, CHARLES R. MARTINEZ, was convicted of Possession
of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony.

The trial judge

sentenced Mr. Martinez to serve zero to five years at the Utah State
Prison but stayed imposition of such prison sentence and placed
Mr. Martinez on probation.

(R 31-2).

Thereafter, on February 7,

1990, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether
Mr. Martinez had violated the terms of his probation.

At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked Mr. Martinez'
probation and committed him to the Utah State Prison; the judge
entered his written order to that effect on February 13, 1990.
(R 50-1).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 2, 1990, Jeffrey T. Stickley, an officer with
Adult Probation & Parole , went to an apartment located at 8070 West
3500 South, number 23, where he believed Charles Martinez, the
Appellant, resided.

(T 5, 6, 30).*

At approximately eight o'clock at night, Mr. Stickley and
three other agents (T 29) arrived at the address and knocked on the
door.

(T 7).

After the officers knocked loudly several times, a

man answered the door.

Officer Stickley introduced himself as

Mr. Martinez' probation officer and stated that he would like to
come in and see if Mr. Martinez was there.

(T 7).

The man who

answered the door identified himself as Mike Martinez, Charles
Martinez7 brother.

(T 8).

In addition to Mike Martinez, the officers encountered
another male and female (who are not identified in the record) in
the apartment.

(T 8 ) . 2

1

On the Probation Agreement which Mr. Martinez signed on
December 18, 1989 (see Addendum A), Mr. Martinez listed his address
as 8076 West 3500 South, #23, Magna, Utah. According to the field
operations report, Officer Stickley testified that it was hard to
tell whether the number written on the field operations report was
8070 or 8076 (T 5), but that he had been to the apartment complex
before and found that the only apartment 23 was located at 8070 West
not 8076 West. (T 14). The field operations report apparently also
indicated that Mr. Martinez resided with Debbie Hardmen, his
fiancee. (T 6).
2

The officer testified that he did eventually learn the
names of the other two people in the apartment, but he refused to
disclose their identity because of a pending investigation of the
two persons. (T 31). Therefore, the State never established
whether the girlfriend who shared the house with Mr. Martinez was
present during the search.
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Probation Officer Stickley asked Mike Martinez if Stickley
and the other officers could search the house for Charles Martinez.
(T 8).

According to Stickley, Michael Martinez responded, "We have

nothing to hide in here.

Go ahead."

(T 8 ) .

During the search, officers found in the southeastern
bedroom a receipt for a scale from the ChemShop.

(T 16).

Officer

Stickley did not know exactly where in that bedroom the receipt was
found.

An officer also found a scale on the kitchen counter,

thirty-seven small pipe screens on a kitchen cabinet, and ammunition
on the kitchen table.

(T 17, 21, 22). An officer found a glass

vial containing white residue, a small hand-held scale in a box, and
Charles Martinez' work card in the southwest bedroom.

(T 21).

Officers also found a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol
tucked into the mattress of the bed in one of the bedrooms.
(T 22).

The State did not establish in which bedroom the gun was

located.
After a hearing, the trial judge revoked Mr. Martinez'
probation, finding that he was in violation of probation based on
Possession of a Firearm and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, as
outlined in Points 3 and 4 of the Affidavit in Support of Order to
Show Cause.

See Addendum B for copy of Affidavit.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
At the very least, the State must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant has violated a
condition of probation in order to revoke probation.

- 4

There is no evidence in this case linking the firearm found
in the apartment to Mr. Martinez, Nor is there any evidence that
possession of the firearm violated state or federal law, as required
by condition number 5.
There is not a sufficient nexus between any paraphernalia
found in the apartment and Mr, Martinez; nor does the evidence
establish an intent on the part of Mr. Martinez to use the
paraphernalia in conjunction with illegal substances.
The officers violated Mr. Martinez' fourth amendment rights
when they searched the apartment.

Assuming, arguendo. that

Mr. Martinez could be linked to the apartment, the Probation
Agreement did not allow officers to enter unless they had a
reasonable suspicion.

Mr. Martinez7 brother could not consent to

entry and the officers failed to articulate facts amounting to a
reasonable suspicion.
Mr. Martinez' due process rights were violated when the
trial judge violated his probation based on the violation of
conditions not outlined in the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show
Cause.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO REVOKE
MR. MARTINEZ' PROBATION.
On January 3, 1990, the State filed an "Affidavit in
Support of Order to Show Cause/1 alleging four violations of
probation conditions by Mr. Martinez.
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(R 34-5).

(See Addendum B.)

Following a hearing held on February 7, 1990, the trial court
dismissed the first two allegations based on insufficient evidence.
(T 55). The court found, however, that there was sufficient
evidence to establish the third and fourth allegations,

(T 55).

The third and fourth allegations are that Mr. Martinez:
(3) had "in his possession a Firearm, on or about
January 2, 1990, at about 8072 West 3500 South,
number 23, in Magna, Utah, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, in violation of condition number 5 of the
probation agreement" and
(4) "committed the offense of possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, on or about
January 2, 1990, at about 8072 West, 3500 South,
number 23, in Magna, Utah, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah in violation of condition number 5 of the
probation agreement."
A. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO SUPPORT THE
ALLEGATION THAT MR. MARTINEZ HAD A FIREARM IN HIS
POSSESSION IN VIOLATION OF STATE OR FEDERAL LAW.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9) (1953 as amended), the statute
applicable to probation violations, does not articulate the burden
of proof to be applied by the trial judge in making findings that
the defendant has violated a condition of probation.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-18-1(9) provides in pertinent part:
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall
admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit. If
the defendant denies the allegations of the
affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present
evidence on the allegations. The persons who have
given adverse information on which the allegations
are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for
good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may call
witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and
present evidence.
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(e) After the hearing, the court shall make
findings of fact. Upon a finding that the defendant
violated the conditions of probation, the court may
order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or
that the entire probation term commence anew. If
probation is revoked, the defendant shall be
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall
be executed.
Nor does Utah case law outline the applicable burden of proof.
State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 1981).

See

In Cowdell, the

Utah Supreme Court pointed out that "[t]he decision to modify or
revoke probation is basically a discretionary matter" and that such
modification or revocation must fit within due process precepts.
Id. at 488.
Whether the proper exercise of the trial judge's discretion
in revoking probation requires that the State meet a specific burden
of proof is not clear in Utah.

However, a number of jurisdictions

explicitly require the State to prove a probation violation by at
least a "preponderance of the evidence."

See, e.g., State v.

Dawson, 282 S.E.2d 284, 288 (W. Va. 1981); Egerstaffer v. Israel,
726 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1984).3

Because a criminal conviction and

jail or prison sentence is involved, it is reasonable to require at
a minimum that the State prove by a preponderance of evidence thajt
the individual violated a condition of his probation.

3

A few jurisdictions use a standard under which the State
must prove the violation to a "reasonable satisfaction." See
Wink v. State. 563 A.2d 414 (Md. 1989); Dingstaff v. State, 480 S.2d
50 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985). At least one jurisdiction requires the
State to prove substantial evidence of the violation in order to
revoke probation. See State ex rel. Thompson v. Riveland, 326
N.W.2d 768 (Wise. 1982).
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The violation must be willful and substantial and there
must be "competent evidence of a violation" of a probation condition
in order to revoke.

See Williams v. Harris, 149 P.2d 640 (Utah

1944) . Once a defendant has been placed on probation, he has a
right to rely on the continuation of that probationary status unless
"just cause" exists to revoke probation.
Bonza, 150 P.2d 970f 972 (Utah 1944).

Id. at 642; State v.

See also Baine v. Beckstead,

347 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah 1959), quoting State v. Zolantakis. 259 P.
1044, 1047 ("[T]he right to personal liberty is one of the most
sacred and valuable rights of a citizen and should not be regarded
lightly.").

Therefore, a defendant has the right to expect

continued liberty so long as the conditions imposed upon him are
complied with.

Id.

Regardless of the standard applied, the prosecution has the
burden of proof and the trial judge cannot revoke probation
arbitrarily or capriciously or otherwise abuse his or her discretion
in revoking probation.

See Bonza, 150 P.2d at 972.

In the present case, the trial judge abused his discretion
in finding that Mr. Martinez violated his probation by "having in
his possession a Firearm, on or about January 2, 1990, at about 8072
West 3500 South, number 23, in Magna, Utah, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, in violation of condition number 5 of the probation
agreement" (emphasis added).
Condition number 5 of the probation agreement provides:
I shall obey all state and federal laws and
municipal ordinances at all times. I shall report
any arrests or citations to the Department of
Corrections within seventy-two hours of occurrence.
- 8
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See Addendum A.

In order to possess a firearm in violation of the

above condition, as claimed in allegation number 3, Mr. Martinez*
possession of any firearm would have to constitute a crime under
Utah or United States law.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 outlines the

persons not permitted to have firearms.

It provides:

(1)(a) Any person who is not either a
citizen of the United States or a lawfully admitted
alien whose business, occupation, or duties require
the use of a dangerous weapon; or a lawfully
admitted alien who has obtained a special hunting
permit from the Department of Safety; or any person
who has been convicted of any crime of violence
under the laws of the United States, the State, or
any other state, government, or country or who is
addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or any
person who has been declared mentally incompetent
may not own or have in his possession or under his
custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined
in this part. The Department of Public Safety shall
adopt rules governing the issuance and use of
special hunting permits for lawfully admitted aliens.
(d) Any person who violates this section is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and if the
dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed off shotgun,
he is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2)(a) Any person who is on parole for a
felony or is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison
or other like facility may not have in his
possession or under his custody or control any
dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this section is
guilty of a third degree felony, and if the
dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive or infernal
machine, he is guilty of a second degree felony.4

4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 through 509 outlaw specific
uses of firearms, including the carrying of a concealed dangerous
weapon, the carrying of a loaded firearm in a vehicle, the use of a
dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, the possession of a deadly
weapon with intent to assault, the discharge of a firearm from a
vehicle and the possession of a dangerous weapon by a minor. See
Addendum C. There is no evidence in this case that Mr. Martinezi
violated any of these statutes.
- 9
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The State failed to produce any evidence that Mr. Martinez
was not a citizen, that he had been convicted of a crime of
violence, that he was addicted to a narcotic drug, that he was
mentally incompetent, or that he was otherwise not entitled to
possess a firearm under federal or state laws.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-10-503(e) defines crimes of violence; possession of a
controlled substance, the crime with which Mr. Martinez was
convicted in the instant case, is not included in that list of
crimes of violence.

Nor was Mr. Martinez on parole or incarcerated.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(2) clarifies that keeping an
unloaded firearm in a residence is not a crime.

It states:

(2) Nothing in this part 5 shall prevent any
person, except those persons described in
§ 76-10-503, from keeping within his place of
residence, place of business, or any vehicle under
his control any firearm, except that it shall be a
class B misdemeanor to carry a loaded firearm in a
vehicle.
Hence, there is absolutely no evidence in the present case that
possession of a firearm in a residence was a crime, in violation of
condition number 5 of the probation agreement.5

5

Even if the State had intended that a showing of
possession of a firearm would violate condition number 6 of the
agreement, the facts and circumstances of the instant case do not
establish that possession of an unloaded gun in the residence would
violate condition number 6 of the probation agreement. Condition
number 6 states: "I shall not own, possess, or have under my
control or in my custody any explosives, firearms, or any dangerous
weapons in violation of 18 USC § 921, et seq.; 18 USC App. § 1201,
et seq. or Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 as amended" (emphasis added).
(continued)
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Even if this Court were to construe the probation agreement
to preclude any possession of firearms, regardless of whether that
possession violated a state or federal law, the evidence in the
present case did not establish that Mr. Martinez possessed or had
under his custody or control the firearm.

Mr. Martinez was not

present when officers searched the house (T 8, 10), and the Stat^
failed to link the firearm to Mr. Martinez.

(T 22).

The testimony

established that the gun was in one of the bedrooms but failed to
show which bedroom or whether it was a bedroom occupied by
Mr. Martinez.

Although Mr. Martinez apparently claimed that he

lived in the apartment with his girlfriend when he signed the
probation agreement on December 18, 1989, (T 6), the State did not
establish that he in fact lived there at the time of the search.
The probation officer had never seen Mr. Martinez there and, in
fact, he encountered two other persons when the officers searched

(footnote 5 continued)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 contains definitions.
Possession of an unloaded firearm does not violate that statute as
required by condition number 6. 18 USC § 1201, et seq. was repealed
on May 19, 1986. 18 USC § 921 is also a definitional statute; there
is no evidence that Mr. Martinez violated it. Perhaps the
Department of Corrections intended condition number 6 to be an
agreement not to possess any firearms as defined in the statutes
listed. However, the condition does not say that. Because a
criminal defendant is entitled to have the conditions of his
probation clearly outlined (see Morrissey v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 47l,
499 (1972)), the explicit language of condition number 6 cannot be
changed to outlaw any possession of a firearm. In the present case,
the judgment itself did not require the defendant not to possess
firearms. The only enunciation of that condition appears to be in
condition numbers 5 and 6 of the probation agreement, both of which
outlaw the possession only if it violates state and federal laws^
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the apartment.

The fact that the address listed by Mr. Martinez in

the probation agreement was 8076 West 3500 South raises a further
question as to whether Mr. Martinez lived in the apartment searched
by the officers.6
While actual possession of contraband is not necessary to
sustain a conviction for a possessory crime, the facts and
circumstances of a particular case must establish "constructive
possession" in order to sustain a conviction.
P.2d 316 (Utah 1985).

See State v. Fox, 709

In Fox, the Utah Supreme Court overturned

convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute and production of a controlled substance when the State
failed to show a sufficient nexus between the defendant, who had
lived in a house in which officers found numerous marijuana plants,
and the plants.

The Court stated:

To find the defendant had constructive possession of
the drug or other contraband, it is necessary to
prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the
accused and the drug to permit an inference that the
accused had both the power and the intent to
exercise dominion and control over the drug,
[citations omitted]
Id. at 319.

In the present case, the officers knocked loudly

several times before anyone answered the door.

While the officers

waited outside, an individual inside the premises could quickly have
secreted the gun under the mattress.

Mr. Martinez was not present

at the time of the search, the probation officer had never seen him

6

The Probation Agreement lists the address of 8076 West;
the Affidavit lists it as 8072 West, and Officer Stickley testified
that it was 8070 West.
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at the residence, and there is no showing, such as personal effects,
that Mr. Martinez occupied the room in which the gun was located.
The State failed to establish any nexus between Mr. Martinez and the
gun, and the trial judge therefore abused his discretion in finding
that the State proved the third allegation.

B. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
THAT MR. MARTINEZ HAD COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 outlaws the possession with
intent to use drug paraphernalia.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3 defines

drug paraphernalia and Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-4 outlines
considerations in determining whether an object is drug
paraphernalia.

See Addendum C.

As was the case with the firearm, the State failed to
establish a sufficient nexus between Mr. Martinez and the
paraphernalia.

The officers found the scale on the kitchen counter;

three persons other than Mr. Martinez were present in the area.
(T 17, 8). Mr. Martinez was not present nor had the officers seen
him in the apartment.

(T 8, 10, 30). Although the officers found a

receipt to Mr. Martinez for a scale, the State did not establish
that the receipt was for the scale which was in fact found in the
kitchen.

Under the circumstances of this case, finding a scale in

the kitchen was not sufficient to show that Mr. Martinez was in
possession of that scale.

- 13 -

In order to violate Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5, an
individual must not only possess an item of drug paraphernalia but
must possess that item with an intent to use it in conjunction with
illegal substances.

Even if this Court believed the evidence was

sufficient to link the scale to Mr. Martinez, the State nevertheless
did not establish that he used or intended to use the scale in
conjunction with illegal substances after being placed on probation.

POINT II. THE OFFICERS ILLEGALLY SEIZED THE
EVIDENCE FROM THE APARTMENT.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
protects probationers.

See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 438 U.S. 868

(1987) . Although a warrant based on probable cause is not required
to search the residence of a probationer, "reasonable grounds" to
justify a warrantless search must exist or the officers must obtain
a valid consent to search in order to comply with the fourth
amendment.

Id.; State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-1 (Utah

1983) .

A. THE SIGNED PROBATION AGREEMENT IS NOT A CONSENT
TO SEARCH.
Mr. Martinez objected to the introduction of any evidence
seized from the apartment during the order to show cause hearing,
arguing that the State had not established the legality of the
search.

(T 10). The State responded that the conditions of the

probation agreement allowed the search.

(T 10-11, 12-13).

The

trial court overruled the objection, concluding that the probation
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agreement made the search lawful.

(T 15-16).

The probation agreement in the instant case contains two
conditions which refer to the search of a residence.

Condition

number 8 states:
I agree to allow an agent of the Department of
Corrections to search my person, residence, vehicle
or any other property under my control without a
warrant, at any time, day or night, upon reasonable
suspicion as ascertained by an agent of the
Department of Corrections to insure compliance with
the conditions of probation.
(emphasis added).
Condition number 14 states "submit person, residence and
vehicle to search for drugs."
In State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1260 n.4, the Utah
Supreme Court noted that signing a parole agreement which contains a
condition similar to the conditions set forth above "cannot in
itself constitute a waiver of constitutional rights."

Id.

Pursuant

to Velasquez, despite the existence of a parole agreement which
contains such a provision, the parole officer must nevertheless have
a reasonable suspicion that the parolee committed a parole violation
or crime in order to conduct a warrantless search.
At the very least, probationers are entitled to the same
protections as parolees.

Therefore, pursuant to Velasquez, the

probation officer in the instant case needed a reasonable suspicion
based on articulable facts in order to search the apartment.

The

agreement, standing alone, did not allow entry.
In addition, the language of the agreement itself
demonstrates that the probation agreement does not operate as a
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consent to enter where the probationer is not present.

In condition

number 8, the probationer agreed to allow an agent to enter.

On its

face, this language requires a probationer to not resist a search if
he is present but does not waive the fourth amendment right against
illegal search and seizure.

Condition number 14 is similar in that

the probationer must "submit" his residence to a search.

Again, the

probationer must either actively consent to the search at the time
the officers attempt to carry out the search, or, as the Court
pointed out in State v. Velasquez, the language of the agreement
allows the officers to enter based upon reasonable suspicion and
dispenses with the usual requirement that a warrant based upon
probable cause is required to search a residence.

B. MR. MARTINEZ' BROTHER COULD NOT CONSENT TO A
SEARCH OF THE APARTMENT.
The burden is on the State to prove that a person giving
consent to a search had the authority to do so.

State v. Johnson,

716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Idaho 1986); see also U.S. v. Matlock. 415 U.S.
164 (1974) . In order to sustain this burden, the State is required
to show that permission to search was obtained from a party who
"possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to
the premises or effects sought to be inspected."

Id.

The characteristics of common authority are mutual use
and/or joint access or control, as would be the case with
cohabitants.

Johnson, 716 P.2d at 1294 n.7.

In addition, the State

must establish that the defendant assumed the risk "that one of
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their number might permit the common area to be searched."

Id.,

erupting U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).7
The State failed to introduce any evidence that
Mr. Martinez' brother had mutual use, joint access or joint control
over the apartment.

Indeed, the only evidence presented by the

State as to who resided at the premises was the operations field
report, which apparently stated that Appellant and his girlfriend
were the only residents of the apartment.

(T 6).

The State also

failed to introduce any evidence that Mr. Martinez had assumed the
risk that his brother might consent to a search of his home. A
valid consent to search did not occur in this case.

C. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PROBATION
OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT MR. MARTINEZ
HAD COMMITTED A CRIME OR VIOLATED A TERM OF
PROBATION, THEREBY JUSTIFYING A WARRANTLESS SEARCH.
In Velasquez, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the
requirement that "a parole officer must have reasonable grounds for
investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of his parole
or committed a crime" in order to search.

Velasquez, 672 P.2d at

1260.

Any search must be "reasonably related to the officer's

duty."

The "middle ground" position adopted by the Court in

Velasquez precludes parole officers from conducting full searches of
parolees' homes whenever or as often as they choose.

7

See Latta v.

Even if the State were able to establish both elements,
the officer may still be able to search only common areas and not
areas over which the defendant has exclusive control. State v.
Johnson, 716 P.2d at 1294.
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Fitzharris. 521 F.2d 246# 252 (1975).

"Indeed it has been suggested

that providing parole authorities with an unlimited power to conduct
indiscriminate searches actually undermines the rehabilitation
process."

Id.

Under Velasquez, "[a] search cannot be based upon a mere
hunch without factual basis nor upon 'casual rumor, general
reputation, or mere whim./M
P.2d at 1262.

(Citation omitted.)

Velasquez. 672

Instead, the officer must articulate specific facts

or circumstances that gave rise to an articulable suspicion.

In

Velasquez, the officers relied on the tip from an informer,
information from a person at the Salt Lake County Mental Health
Center, and the observation that the parolees did not have a job.
Velasquez. 672 P.2d at 1262.

See also Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483

U.S. 868 (1987) (a tip by a reliable informant was sufficient
evidence of violation to allow a search); State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d
1069 (Utah 1987) (evidence demonstrating probable cause to believe
the defendant had committed a forgery met the reasonable suspicion
standard).
In the present case, the State produced no evidence
demonstrating that the probation officer had a reasonable suspicion
that Mr. Martinez had violated a condition of probation or committed
a crime.

The officer stated early in his testimony that earlier in

the evening on January 1, 1990, he had received a phone call from a
dispatcher at a halfway house requesting that he contact a deputy
sheriff, and that the probation officer then spoke to the deputy
sheriff.

(T 6).

The probation officer testified that he spoke to
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the deputy "about an alleged assault by Mr. Martinez upon his coinmon
law wife."

At that point, defense counsel objected to the testimony

and the trial court sustained the objection.
The prosecutor then asked:

(T 6).

"You had a discussion, and as a

result of that discussion and as a result of the contact by
dispatch, did you, in fact, go to the apartment of Mr. Martinez?"
(T 7).

The probation officer responded:

"Yes, I did."

The

probation officer gave no other information as to why he was at the
apartment.

Because an objection to the statement about the alleged

assault was sustained, that statement should not be considered in
determining whether the State established that the probation officer
had a reasonable suspicion.

However, even if it were considered,

the statement is unclear and fails to set forth articulable facts to
justify the search.

Being directed to a residence by a deputy

sheriff is not enough to sustain a search.

The officer gave no

background as to the facts of the alleged assault or whether
Mr. Martinez had been charged with the crime as a result of that
incident.8

Even if he had committed such a crime, searching the

apartment in cupboards, under mattresses, etc. would not have aided
in locating any evidence in regard to that crime.

Nor would it have

aided the officers in locating Mr. Martinez.
The State also introduced evidence that on December 18,
1989, when Mr. Martinez signed his probation agreement, the officer

8

The alleged assault was reflected in allegation number 1
of the Affidavit in Support of the Order to Show Cause. The State
presented no evidence in support of this allegation.
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asked him whether or not he was still using controlled substances.
According to the officer, at that time, Mr. Martinez claimed that he
was smoking cocaine on a daily basis.

(T 23) . Defense counsel

objected to this testimony as irrelevant since it happened two weeks
before the date of the search and before Mr. Martinez signed his
probation agreement.

(T 23).

The trial judge overruled the

objection and admitted the testimony.

(T. 24). Because the

statement occurred two weeks prior to the search, it did not give
the officers a reasonable suspicion to search at the time the search
was conducted.
In this case, the prosecution simply failed to set forth
articulable facts amounting to a reasonable suspicion that
Mr. Martinez had either committed a crime or violated a term of
probation and, therefore, the search violated Mr. Martinez' fourth
amendment rights and all of the evidence acquired in the search
should have been excluded.

In the absence of the evidence seized

from the apartment, neither allegation number 3 nor allegation
number 4 of the affidavit in support of the order to show cause can
be established.

POINT III. MR. MARTINEZ' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE RELIED ON CONDITIONS
NUMBER 15 AND 6 IN REVOKING PROBATION.
In articulating his decision, the trial judge stated that
Mr. Martinez had violated condition number 6 and condition number 15
of the probation agreement.

(T 53). Despite defense counsel's

objection that the State had not alleged a violation of condition
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number 15, the court nevertheless apparently relied on that
condition in violating probation,

(T 54). 9 See Addendum D for

transcript of entire ruling.
The purpose behind statutes which allow for probation is to
"provide an opportunity for reformation."
970, 972 (Utah 1944).

State v. Bonza, 150 P.2d

In keeping with this purpose, "[t]he decision

of a trial court to modify or revoke probation is basically a
discretionary matter . . . Nevertheless, in revoking probation, a
court may not ignore fundamental precepts of fairness protected by
the due process clause."

Id. at 488.

Among the due process rights possessed by a defendant in a
probation revocation hearing are notice, the right to
cross-examination, and the privilege of presenting evidence.
Baine v. Beckstead, 347 P.2d at 557.
In State v. Cowdell. the trial judge relied on a condition
not in the affidavit to revoke probation.

The affidavit in that

case claimed that the defendant had committed an aggravated robbery;
the trial judge, instead, relied on the defendant's driving under
the influence in violating probation.

The Utah Supreme Court

determined that the trial court erred in relying on a condition not
set forth in the affidavit because the defendant had not been given
adequate notice of the claims against him.
defendant is entitled to written notice.

9

Id.

At a minimum, the

The Cowdell Court stated:

When the trial judge made his final findings, he did not
rely on the violation of these two conditions. (T 55). They should
not be relied on either in revoking probation or affirming the trial
court's decision.
- 21 -

Lack of notice of a reason for which a person might
be deprived of liberty completely denies that person
the right to prepare a defense and effectively
destroys the value of any defense that is available.
Id. at 489.

In Cowdell, the Court determined that the defendant had

not received proper notice and that the error was prejudicial/
requiring reversal of the revocation order.
In the present case, Mr. Martinez did not receive notice
that the trial court would rely on any allegations other than those
set forth in the affidavit.

Furthermore, the evidence itself does

not establish that Mr. Martinez "frequented places where drugs were
used or sold," since he was not present when the officers appeared
in the apartment.

The trial judge erroneously relied on conditions

not set forth in the affidavit in support of the order to show
cause; such reliance should not support the probation violation in
this case.

CONCLUSION
Appellant, Charles Martinez, respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the revocation order and remand this case to the
trial court.
SUBMITTED this

£

day of August, 1990.

L/NN R. BROWN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
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day of August, 1990.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED by
this

day of August, 1990.
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ADDENDUM A

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
PROBATION AGREEMENT

3RD DISTRICT

fiQlQOnQfl

COURT

COUNTY/ CASE #

, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Department of
I, Charles Marrinpz
Corrections and to be accountable for my actions and conduct to the Department of Corrections and the Court
I further agree to abide by all conditions of probation as ordered by the Court and set forth in this Agreement
consistent with the laws of the State of Utah. I fully understand that violation of this Agreement and/or any conditions
thereof or any new conviction for a crime may result in action by the Court causing my probation to be revoked or my
probation period to commence again.
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
1. I shall report directly to my supervising agent in person by the 5th of each month or as otherwise directed.
2. I shall permit visits to my place of residence, my place of employment or elsewhere as required by the Department
of Corrections for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of probation.
3. I shall establish a residence of record and shall reside at such residence in fact and on record and shall not
change my place of residence without the knowledge of my probation agent
4. I shall not leave the State of Utah without prior written authorization from the Department of Corrections. I agree
and acknowledge that should I leave the State of Utah without prior written authonzation from the Department of
Corrections, that I hereby waive extradition proceedings from any jurisdiction in which I may be found.
5. I shall obey all state and federal laws and municipal ordinances at ail times. I shall report any arrests or citations to
the Department of Corrections within 72 hours of occurrence.
6. I shall not own, possess, or have under my control or in my custody any explosives, firearms, or any dangerous
weapons in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 921, et seq.; 18 U.S.C. App. § 1201, et seq. or Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501, as amended.
7. I shall abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of
marijuana, narcotics, controlled substances or other drugs as defined in the Controlled Substance Act Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-2, as amended. I agree to submit to urinalysis or other tests for marijuana, narcotics, controlled substances or other
drugs upon reasonable suspicion as ascertained by and at the request of a probation agent of the Department of
Corrections to ensure compliance with this condition of probation.
8. I agree to allow an agent of the Department of Corrections to search my person, residence, vehicle or any other
property under my control, without a warrant any time day or night upon reasonable suspicion as ascertained by an agent
of the Department of Corrections to ensure compliance with the conditions of probation.
9. I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner which can reasonably be expected to result in, or
which has resulted in criminal or illegal activity.
10. I shall seek, obtain and maintain verifiable, lawful employment and/or education.
11. I shall comply with the following special conditi^s as ordered by the Court
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I have read, understand and agree to the above conditions and I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of this
Agreement
Dated this.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF

Plaintiff,

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

VS
MARTINEZ,

Court Case No: 891901398
Judge: Raymond S. Uno
Def. A t t y . ' : Kirk Bennett

Charles

Defendant

STATE OF UTAH

)

) : ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
J e f f r e y T. S t i c k l e y , b e i n g d u l y sworn upon an oath
d e p o s e s and s a y s t h a t :

He i s a P r o b a t i o n O f f i c e r

for the Utah S t a t e

Department of C o r r e c t i o n s ; t h a t on the 23rd day of O c t o b e r , 1 9 8 9 , t h e
above-named d e f e n d a n t was adjudged g u i l t y of the crime of

Unlawful

P o s s e s s i o n of a C o n t r o l l e d Substance in the a b o v e - e n t i t l e d Court and on
t h e 20th day of November, 1989, was s e n t e n c e d

to s e r v e a term of 0-5

years

i n the Utah S t a t e P r i s o n ; t h a t the e x e c u t i o n of the imposed s e n t e n c e was
s t a y e d and the d e f e n d a n t was p l a c e d on p r o b a t i o n under the s u p e r v i s i o n

of

t h e Department of C o r r e c t i o n s ; t h a t the a b o v e - e n t i t l e d defendant did
violate
to-wit:

the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of the d e f e n d a n t ' s

p r o b a t i o n as

follows,

-21.

By having committed the offense of Spouse Abuse, a class A Misdemeanor
on or about January 1, 1990, at about 8072 W. 3500 South, #23, Magna,
UT, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in violation of condition number
5 of the probation agreement,

2.

By having committed the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance
a Third Degree Felony, in Magna, Utah, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
in violation of condition numbers 5 and 7 of the probation agreement.

3.

By having had in his possession a Firearm, on or about January 2, 1990,
at about 8072 W. 3500 South, #23, in Magna, Utah, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, in violation of condition number 5 of the probation
agreement.

4.

By having committed the offense of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a
class B Misdemeanor, on or about January 2, 1990, at about 8072 West,
3500 South, #23, in Magna, Utah, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in
violation of condition number 5 of the probation agreement.

WHEREFORE, vour affiant prays that an Order of the Court issue
directing and requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear before
said Court to show cause, if any,

has, why the aforesaid period of

probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant should not be
forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison.

.'Sticfcley, PRPBTATION OFFICER
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

Cy

rcL

dav of

19j&_.

J^KUar

£

RV1 PUBLIC
ARY
Residing: Salt Lake City, Utah

Commission expires:

\'&-)—)*fl0
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ADDENDUM C

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when
the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice-President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or the
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any
of the male inhabitants of such State, being
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in
the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or
Representative in Congress, or elector of President
and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or
military, under the United States, or under any
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United
States, or as a member of any State legislature or
as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall
have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against
the same or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds
pf each House, remove such disability.

Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred
for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
questioned. But neither the United States nor any
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against
the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts,
obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and
void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article.

58-37a-3. "Drug paraphernalia" defined.
As used in this chapter:
"Drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, product, or material used,
or intended for use, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, package, repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of
Chapter 37, Title 58, and includes, but is not limited to:
(1) Kits used, or intended for use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, or harvesting any species of plant which is a controlled substance or from which a controlled substance can be derived;
(2) Kits used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding,
converting, producing, processing, or preparing a controlled substance;
(3) Isomerization devices used, or intended for use, to increase the
potency of any species of plant which is a controlled substance;
(4) Testing equipment used, or intended for use, to identify or to
analyze the strength, effectiveness, or purity of a controlled substance;
(5) Scales and balances used, or intended for use, in weighing or
measuring a controlled substance;
(6) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannited, dextrose and lactose, used, or intended for use to cut
a controlled substance;
(7) Separation gins and sifters used, or intended for use to remove
twigs, seeds, or other impurities from marihuana;
(8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used, or
intended for use to compound a controlled substance;
(9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, or
intended for use to package small quantities of a controlled substance;
(10) Containers and other objects used, or intended for use to store
or conceal a controlled substance;
(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, or intended for use to parenterally inject a controlled substance into the
human body; and
(12) Objects used, or intended for use to ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce marihuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the
human body, including but not limited to:
(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic
pipes with or without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads,
or punctured metal bowls;
(b) Water pipes;
(c) Carburetion tubes and devices;
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks;
(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning material, such as a marihuana cigarette, that has become too small or
too short to be held in the hand;
(f) Miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vials;
(g) Chamber pipes;
(h) Carburetor pipes;
(i) Electric pipes;
(j) Air-driven pipes;
(k) Chillums;
0) Bongs; and
(m) Ice pipes or chillers.

58-37a-4. Considerations in determining whether object is
drug paraphernalia*
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trier of fact, in
addition to all other logically relevant factors, should consider:
(1) statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use;
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the
object, under any state or federal law relating to a controlled substance;
(3) the proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of
this chapter;
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled substance;
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object;
(6) instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object con
cerning its use;
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain of depict its use;
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use;
(9) the manner in which the object is displayed for sale;
(10) whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate
supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed
distributor or dealer of tobacco products;
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object
to the total sales of the business enterprise;
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the
community; and
(13) expert testimony concerning its use.

58-37a-5. Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person
who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

PART 5
WEAPONS
76-10-501. Uniform law — Definitions.
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally
protected right, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform laws
throughout the state.
(b) The provisions of this part are uniformly applicable throughout this
state and in all its political subdivisions and municipalities. No local
authority may enact or enforce any rule in conflict with the provisions of
this part.
(2) For the purpose of this part:
(a) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In
construing whether an item, object, or thing not commonly known as a
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument, object, or thing; the character of the wound produced, if any; and
the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used are determinative.
(b) "Firearms" means pistols, revolvers, sawed-off shotguns, or sawedoff rifles, or any device that could be used as a weapon from which is
expelled a projectile by any force.
(c) "Sawed-ofF shotgun" means a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of
fewer than 18 inches in length, or in the case of a rifle, having a barrel or
barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any weapon made from a rifle
or shotgun by alteration, modification, or otherwise, if the weapon as
modified has an overall length of fewer than 26 inches.
(d) "Prohibited area" means any place where it is unlawful to discharge
a weapon.
(e) "Crime of violence" means murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape,
mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, extortion, or
blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, arson pimishable by imprisonment for
more than one year, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses.
(f) "Bureau" means the Utah State Bureau of Criminal Identification.

76-10-502. When weapon deemed loaded.
For the purpose of this section, any pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, or other
weapon described in this part shall be deemed to be loaded when there is an
unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile in the firing position, except in the
case of pistols and revolvers, in which case they shall be deemed loaded when
the unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is in a position that the manual
operation of any mechanism once would cause the unexpended cartridge,
shell, or projectile to befired;and a muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed tc
be loaded when it is capped or primed and has a powder charge and ball or
shot in the barrel or cylinders.

76-10-503. Possession of dangerous weapon — Persons
not permitted to have — Provisions for aliens —
Penalties.
(1) (a) Any person who is not either a citizen of the United States or a
lawfully admitted alien whose business, occupation, or duties require the
use of a dangerous weapon; or a lawfully admitted alien who has obtained
a special hunting permit from the Department of Public Safety; or any
person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under the laws of
the United States, the state, or any other state, government, or country,
or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or any person who has
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in
this part. The Department of Public Safety shall adopt rules governing
the issuance and use of special hunting permits for lawfully admitted
aliens.
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun,
he is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole for a felony or is incarcerated at the
Utah state prison or other like facility may not have in his possession or
under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this
part.
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a third degree
felony, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive or infernal
machine, he is guilty of a second degree felony.

76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon.
(1) Any person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503 and
those persons exempted under Section 76-10-510, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor,
except that a firearm that contains no ammunition and is enclosed in a case,
gun box, or securely-tied package shall not be considered a concealed weapon,
but:
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains no ammunition,
he shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(b) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains ammunition, he
shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor; or
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawed-off shotgun, or if the dangerous
weapon is a firearm and is used to commit a crime of violence, he shall be
guilty of a felony of the third degree.
(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any person, except persons described in Section 76-10-503, from keeping within his place of residence, place
of business, or any vehicle under his control any firearm, except that it shall
be a class B misdemeanor to carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle.

76-10-505. Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle or on street.
Every person who carries a loaded firearm in a vehicle or on any public
street in an incorporated city or in a prohibited area of an unincorporated
territory within this state is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon
in fight or quarrel.
Every person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503, who, not
in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or
exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

76-10-507. Possession of deadly weapon with intent to assault.
Every person having upon his person any dangerous weapon with intent to
unlawfully assault another is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

76-10-508. Discharge of firearm from vehicle or near highway.
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge any kind of firearm from an
automobile or other vehicle or to discharge a firearm from, upon, or across any
highway. A person violating any provision of this section is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.

76-10-509. Possession of dangerous weapon by minor.
A minor under the age of eighteen may not possess a dangerous weapon as
defined herein unless he has the permission of his parent or guardian to have
such weapon or is accompanied by parent or guardian while he has such
weapon in his possession. In any event, any minor who is under the age of
fourteen years must be accompanied by a responsible adult.

76-10-510. Possession of weapon authorized — Permit or
license not required.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to prohibit a citizen of the United
States over the age of eighteen years who resides or is temporarily within this
state and who is not within the excepted classes as prescribed by Section
76-10-503 from owning, possessing, or keeping within his place of residence or
place of business or any vehicle under his control any pistol, revolver, or other
firearm or dangerous weapon capable of being concealed upon the person, and
no permit or license to purchase, own, possess, or to keep any such firearm or
weapon at his place of residence, or place of business, or any vehicle under his
control, shall be required of him.
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(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
(f) serve a term of home confinement;
(g) participate in community service restitution programs;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate.
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the court,
for the collection of fines and restitution during the probation period in cases
for which the court orders supervised probation by the department. The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The
clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the
order to the parties. The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(7) (a) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions. If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, has outstanding fines or restitution owing,
the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant
on bench probation or place the defendant on bench probation for the
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines and restitution. Upon
motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own motion, the court may
require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay should not be
treated as contempt of court or why the suspended jail or prison term
should not be imposed.
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court
and prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall
include a probation progress report and complete report of details on
outstanding fines and restitution orders.
(8) (a) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to
revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke
the probation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or
decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of
time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court. *
(9) (a) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that
the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. Probation may
not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the
conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that

authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation i!
justified. If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing, and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the
hearing. The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him ii
he is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right. *«
present evidence.
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of
the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may
call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence.
(e) After the hearing the coiirt shall make findings of fact. Upon a
finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire
probation term commence anew. If probation is revoked, the defendant
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for "willful
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U.S.C.A. 1985.
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found it.
MR. ELLETT:

It doesn't matter.

MR. BROWN:

It sure does.

THE COURT:

Based on what the court has heard, the

court is of the opinion that the defendant has violated his
conditions of probation.
operations written report.

I was going over the field
And, his signature is on there

stating that his address is 8070 or six West 3500 South,
apartment number 23, and there is only one apartment 23 in
that complexn.

Names of people living at the same address is

only one person, Debbie Hardman.
addresses you stay at.

List other people or

He has none.

So, that means that his

place of residence is that place there.
Based on that, the court, drawing inferences in
regards to that being his place of residence under his
probation agreement, number six it says, I shall not own,
possess or have under my control or custody explosives or
firearms or any dangerous weapons.
The weapon was found under the mattress and in the
place where he has indicated he resides with no other person
other than this Debbie Hardman.

In addition, one of the

conditions that the court released him on, was that he not
frequent any place where drugs are sold, used or otherwise
distributed illegally and these drugs were found in his
premises.

So, whether they were sold or used or distributed,
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1

I don't know, but, apparently, there is some residue and the

2

paraphernalia is there.

3

his probation agreement, do not frequent places where drugs

4

are used, sold.

5
6

MR. BROWN:

Your Honor, that's not one of the

subjects of the order to show cause.

7
8

That would be under number 15 also,

THE COURT:

But, one of the things is, there is a

violation of his probation agreement here.

9

MR. BROWN:

But, as I understand it, the violations

10

are written up in an order to show cause, and they are alleged

11

one, two, three, and four, and they have to be specified for

12

what the violations are.

13

through the violation agreement at this time and pick out

14

things that he may have been in violation of and use that

15

against him even though it hasn't been alleged in the order to

16

show cause.

17

MR. ELLETT:

I don't think the court can go

I dispute that, Your Honor.

I think

18

this court has a right once it's been brought to the court's

19

attention to look at any evidence that indicates a violation

20

of probation.

21

THE COURT:

At least two of the items there are

22

drug paraphernalia, and he's not supposed to be where it's

23

used or sold or possessed.

24

So, at least two of them items that were brought as charges

25

against him, I think, have been shown as far as preponderance

And, the other one is the weapons.
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of the evidence is concerned.
MR. BROWN:

So, what specifically is the court's

finding with regard to the four allegations?

Obviously,

number one, there is no evidence with respect to that.
THE COURT:

Number one, since this is the

evidentiary hearing for this order to show cause, that will be
found not to be, he denied the allegation.

The court supports

his denial and does not find there was any violation.
MR. BROWN:

His allegation dismissed.

THE COURT:

That allegation is dismissed.

And

number two, there was residue there, but aside from the
residue, there does not seem to be any other evidence that
there was controlled substances that he had, so number two
will be dismissed.

But, number three, the court finds he's in

violation of, and number four the court finds he's in
violation of.
MR. STICKLEY:

Your Honor, would you like a

recommendation from our agency?
THE COURT:

I guess we ought to have something

before the court pronounces what it's going to do.
MR. STICKLEY:

Looking back over Mr. Martinez's

long criminal history, he has been on probation previously on
two occasions, and he did violate numerous times and was tried
with new criminal charges.

We have information from

informants.
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